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ABSTRACT
Why is inﬂation persistently high in some periods and low in others? The reason may be absence
of commitment in monetary policy. In a standard model, absence of commitment leads to multiple
equilibria, or expectation traps, even without trigger strategies. In these traps, expectations of high
or low inﬂation lead the public to take defensive actions, which then make accommodating those
expectations the optimal monetary policy. Under commitment, the equilibrium is unique and the
inﬂation rate is low on average. This analysis suggests that institutions which promote commitment
can prevent high inﬂation episodes from recurring.
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to Michael Woodford for detailed comments that substantially improved our work. Chari and Christiano
thank the National Science Foundation for support. The views expressed herein are those of the authors
and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Banks of Chicago, Cleveland, or Minneapolis or the Federal
Reserve System.1. INTRODUCTION
Many countries have experienced prolonged periods of costly, high inﬂation as well as pro-
longed periods of low inﬂation. The United States and other industrialized countries suﬀered
through a high inﬂation episode in the 1970s and are now enjoying a low inﬂation episode.
Why do such inﬂation episodes occur? What should be done to prevent high inﬂation episodes
from recurring? These are two central questions in monetary economics.
One way to answer these questions builds on the time inconsistency literature pioneered
by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983). This literature points to
absence of commitment in monetary policy as the main culprit behind high inﬂation. Static
versions of the models in this literature have a unique equilibrium. Inﬂation rates can ﬂuctuate
only if the underlying fundamentals do. Often, however, it is diﬃcult to identify the changes
in the underlying fundamentals that could have generated the episodes of high and low
inﬂation. In inﬁnite-horizon versions of the Kydland-Prescott and Barro-Gordon models,
trigger strategies can be used to produce the observed inﬂation outcomes. But such models
have embarrassingly many equilibria. It is hard to know what observations would be ruled
out by such trigger strategy equilibria.
Our work here does not include trigger strategies, but it is squarely within the tradition
of the time inconsistency literature in pointing to absence of commitment as the main culprit
behind the observed episodes of high and low inﬂation. We make three contributions. We
show how the economic forces in the Kydland-Prescott and Barro-Gordon models can be
embedded into a standard general equilibrium model. We ﬁnd that once these forces have
been so embedded, inﬂation rates can be high for prolonged periods and low for prolongedperiods, even though trigger strategies are explicitly ruled out. And we think our model is a
promising ﬁrst step toward developing empirically plausible models of inﬂation in the United
States and other countries.
In the Kydland-Prescott and Barro-Gordon models, the key trade-oﬀ is between the
beneﬁts of higher output from unexpected inﬂation and the costs of realised inﬂation. This
is true in our general equilibrium model as well. In our model, unexpected inﬂation raises
output because some prices are sticky. This rise in output has beneﬁts because producers
have monopoly power and the unexpected inﬂation reduces the monopoly distortion. How-
ever, realised inﬂation is costly in our general equilibrium model because households must
use previously accumulated cash to purchase some goods, called cash goods. Higher realised
inﬂation forces households to substitute toward other goods, called credit goods. This substi-
tution tends to lower welfare. Thus, by design, the general equilibrium model captures the
trade-oﬀ between the beneﬁts of unexpected inﬂation and the costs of realised inﬂation in
the Kydland-Prescott and Barro-Gordon framework.
This way of capturing the trade-oﬀ leads to multiple equilibria in our general equi-
librium model. Private agents’ expectations of high or low inﬂation can lead these agents
to take defensive actions, which in eﬀect trap the monetary authority. The agents’ actions
make validating their expectations the optimal monetary policy action. The main defensive
action we focus on is that sticky price ﬁrms set high prices if they expect high inﬂation and
low prices if they expect low inﬂation. Given these expectations and the associated defensive
actions, the monetary authority chooses policy optimally by equating the marginal beneﬁts
of unexpected inﬂation to the marginal costs of realised inﬂation. We show analytically that
marginal beneﬁts equal marginal costs for at least two sets of policies and allocations. Our
2analytical procedure focuses only on necessary conditions for monetary authority optimality.
In a large class of parameterisations, we use numerical methods to identify situations in which
the necessary conditions are suﬃcient and those in which they are not.
In our basic model, the equilibrium interest rate is independent of shocks to technology
and government consumption. Many researchers have presented evidence that the response
of interest rates and other ﬁnancial variables to shocks is very diﬀerent in high and low
inﬂation episodes. This evidence motivates us to develop a variant of our model with a
variable payment technology in which this behaviour occurs. This variant provides a related,
but diﬀerent, channel which also leads to multiplicity of equilibria.
In this variable payment technology model, households can choose the fraction of
goods purchased with cash and the fraction purchased with credit. If households expect high
inﬂation, they defensively choose to purchase few goods with cash, so that the costs of realised
inﬂation are low. Given the gains of inﬂation, the monetary authority then has an incentive to
choose a high level of inﬂation. If households expect low inﬂation, however, they do not take
defensive actions and choose instead to purchase many goods with cash, so that the marginal
costs of realised inﬂation are high. Given the gains of inﬂation, the monetary authority then
has an incentive to choose a low level of inﬂation. These considerations reinforce the sources
of multiplicity in our original model with a ﬁxed payment technology, so that the variable
payment technology model also has multiple equilibria.
In the variable payment technology model, the interest rate responds to shocks. The
interest rate response to a technology shock turns out to switch sign between the high and low
inﬂation equilibria, while output increases in this shock in both equilibria. Our model also
implies higher volatility of nominal variables in high inﬂation episodes than in low inﬂation
3episodes. The sign switch and volatility implications are supported by an examination of
cross-country data (as in Albanesi, Chari and Christiano, 2002a). While a variety of other
models might imply higher volatility, it is hard to see which models would generate the sign
switch observation.
Following Chari, Christiano and Eichenbaum (1998), we call the kind of multiplicity
identiﬁed here an expectation trap because the public’s defensive actions induced by changes
in expectations in eﬀect trap policymakers into accommodating the expectations. Chari,
Christiano and Eichenbaum rely on trigger strategies to generate expectation traps. The
use of trigger strategies, however, is problematic because with them virtually any inﬂation
outcome can be rationalized as an equilibrium. Here we instead restrict attention to Markov
equilibria that rule out trigger strategies. Also, the Markov equilibrium of Chari, Christiano,
and Eichenbaum is at a corner. One contribution of our work here is that it obtains an
interior equilibrium. (See also Neiss, 1999.)
The notion of an expectation trap may shed light on the continuing debate about the
interpretation of the successful and, thus far, sustained reduction in inﬂation since the 1970s
in the United States and other industrialised countries. (See Sargent, 1999, for a discussion
of this debate.) Our work here raises the possibility that the inﬂation of the 1970s was a high
inﬂation expectation trap and that inﬂation may have declined simply because the public
switched to a low inﬂation expectation trap. Since the structure of policymaking institutions
has not fundamentally changed, we here raise the possibility that these countries could once
again fall into a 1970s-style high inﬂation expectation trap.
In our model, without monetary policy commitment, the economy experiences spells
of high and low inﬂation, somewhat like those experienced by many countries. With com-
4mitment, the equilibrium is unique, the nominal interest rate is zero and the inﬂation rate
is low on average. Thus, our analysis points to absence of commitment as the chief culprit
behind high and variable inﬂation. Our analysis suggests that institutions which promote the
ability of central banks to commit to future actions can lead to welfare gains. Such institu-
tions include laws that protect central bank independence and laws that provide appropriate
incentive contracts for central bankers (as in, for example, Persson and Tabellini, 1993).
We proceed as follows. In Section 2, we describe the model with a ﬁxed payment
technology. In Section 3, we analyse the equilibria of this model and show that multiplicity
is possible. In Section 4, we analyse an economy with a variable payment technology. In
Section 5, we discuss the main forces behind the expectation traps we ﬁnd, and in Section 6,
we describe the relationship of our work to that of others. The ﬁnal section concludes.
2 .AM O N E T A R YG E N E R A LE Q U I L I B R I U ME C O N O M Y
Our economy extends and modiﬁes the Lucas and Stokey (1983) model with cash and credit
goods in two ways. One modiﬁcation is that, in our model, a subset of prices are set in advance
by monopolistic ﬁrms. The other modiﬁcation is that, as does Svensson (1985), we require
households to use currency accumulated in the previous period to purchase cash goods in the
current period. We assume that the monetary authority chooses monetary policy to maximize
the welfare of the representative household. Our modiﬁcations imply that the trade-oﬀ the
monetary authority confronts resembles that in the Kydland-Prescott and Barro-Gordon
models. The sticky price modiﬁcation implies that an unanticipated monetary expansion
tends to raise output and welfare. The cash-in-advance modiﬁcation implies that the inﬂation
5associated with a monetary expansion reduces welfare by reducing the consumption of cash
goods relative to credit goods.
Our inﬁnite-horizon economy is composed of a continuum of ﬁrms, a representative
household and a monetary authority. The sequence of events within a time period t is as
follows. First, the shock to the production technology, θ, and the shock to government
consumption, g, are realised. We refer to s =( θ,g) as the exogenous state and assume that
s follows a Markov process.1 Then a fraction, µ of ﬁrms–the sticky price ﬁrms–set their
prices. The remaining fraction, 1−µ, of ﬁrms are called ﬂexible price ﬁrms. The average price
set by sticky price ﬁr m si sd e n o t e dPe(s). This price, as well as all other nominal variables,
is scaled by the beginning-of-period aggregate stock of money.
Next, the monetary authority chooses the interest rate, R.2 We denote the policy rule
that the monetary authority is expected to follow by R(s). The state of the economy after
the monetary authority makes its choice, the private sector’s state, is (s,R). Let X(s,R)
denote the money growth rate associated with (s,R). The production, consumption and
employment decisions of the households and ﬁrms and the pricing decisions of the ﬂexible
price ﬁrms depend on the private sector’s state.
In what follows, we ﬁrst describe the problems of the household and ﬁrms in our
economy given (s,R) and expected future monetary policy, R(s). We then set up the monetary
authority’s problem and deﬁne a Markov equilibrium. The key part of a Markov equilibrium
is that the monetary authority chooses policy optimally. To deﬁne the monetary authority’s
problem, we must specify the private equilibrium allocations as functions of the monetary
authority’s policy variable, R. We refer to these functions as a private sector equilibrium.A
Markov equilibrium is a private sector equilibrium in which policy is set optimally.
62.1. The representative household
We begin with the household’s problem. In each period, the household consumes a continuum
of diﬀerentiated goods as in the work of Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) and supplies labour.
The representative household’s preferences are
P∞
t=0 β














ct(ω) denotes consumption of the type ω good, nt denotes labour time and 1−nt leisure time,
0 <ρ<1,ψ>0 and σ>0.
Each good in this continuum is one of four types. A fraction µ of the goods are
produced by sticky price ﬁrms, and a fraction 1 − µ are produced by ﬂexible price ﬁrms. A
fraction z of all goods consist of goods paid for with cash, and a fraction 1 − z consist of
goods paid for with credit. We refer to z as the payment technology parameter. The sticky
and ﬂexible price ﬁrms are randomly distributed over cash and credit goods. Thus, a fraction
µz of goods are sticky price goods purchased with cash, a fraction (1 − µ)z are ﬂexible price
goods purchased with cash, a fraction µ(1 − z) are sticky price goods purchased with credit
and a fraction (1 − µ)(1 − z) are ﬂexible price goods purchased with credit. Since prices
for goods within each type turn out to be the same, utility maximisation implies that the
amounts purchased within each type of good are also the same. Let c11 and c12 denote the
quantities of cash goods purchased from sticky and ﬂexible price ﬁrms, respectively, and let
c21 and c22 denote the quantities of credit goods purchased from sticky and ﬂexible price
7ﬁrms, respectively. Then we have that
c =[ µzc
ρ
11 +( 1− µ)zc
ρ
12 + µ(1 − z)c
ρ





Let A denote the nominal assets of the household, carried over from the previous
period. In the asset market, the household trades money, M, and one-period bonds, B, with
other households. The asset market constraint is
M + B ≤ A. (2)
Recall that nominal assets, money and bonds are all scaled by the aggregate stock of money.
We impose a no-Ponzi constraint of the form B ≤ ¯ B, where ¯ B is a large, ﬁnite upper bound
on bond holdings.
The household’s cash-in-advance constraint is
P
e(s)[µzc11 + q(s,R)(1 − µ)zc12] ≤ M, (3)
where Pe(s), again, denotes the average price set by sticky price ﬁrms and q(s,R)Pe(s)
denotes that set by ﬂexible price ﬁrms. Note that q(s,R) is the relative price of ﬂexible to
sticky price goods. Nominal assets evolve over time as follows:
zP
e(s)[µc11 + q(s,R)(1 − µ)c12]+( 1− z)P
e(s)[µc21 + q(s,R)(1 − µ)c22] (4)
+X(s,R)A
0 ≤ W(s,R)n + D(s,R)+[ X(s,R) − 1] + M + RB.
8In (4), W(s,R) denotes the nominal wage rate and D(s,R) the proﬁts after lump-sum taxes.
Note that A0 is multiplied by X(s,R). This multiplication reﬂects that all nominal variables
are scaled by the beginning-of-period aggregate stock of money, and A0 is the household’s
nominal assets scaled by the next period’s aggregate money stock. The next period’s aggre-
g a t em o n e ys t o c ki ss i m p l yt h ec u r r e n ts t o c km u l t i p l i e db yt h eg r o w t hr a t eX(s,R).
Our description of the asset market is somewhat diﬀerent from that of Svensson (1985).
In Svensson’s model, each household sees itself as facing a cash-in-advance constraint in which
only previously accumulated cash can be used for cash goods purchases. In our setup, an
individual household does not face any such constraint; society as a whole faces it. This
constraint manifests itself as an equilibrium condition that M =1 . The interest rate adjusts
to ensure that the equilibrium condition is satisﬁed, so that the household optimally uses
only previously accumulated cash for cash goods purchases. The analysis with Svensson’s
formulation leads to identical results.
Consider the household’s asset, goods and labour market decisions. Given that the
household expects the monetary authority to choose policy according to R(s) in the future,
the household solves the following problem:





subject to (3), (4) and nonnegativity on allocations. Here we have substituted out for B in
(4) using (2). The solution to (5) yields the household’s decision rules, d(A,s,R), where
d(A,s,R)=[ n(A,s,R),M(A,s,R),A
0(A,s,R),c ij(A,s,R)], (6)
9for i,j =1 ,2.
2.2. The ﬁrms and the economy’s resource constraint
Each of the diﬀerentiated goods in this economy is produced by a monopolist using the
following production technology:
y(ω)=θn(ω),
where y(ω) denotes output and n(ω) denotes the employment level for the type ω good.
Also, recall that θ is a technology shock that is the same for all goods. The household’s
problem yields demand curves for each good. The fraction, 1 − µ,o fﬁrms that are ﬂexible
price ﬁrms set their price to maximise proﬁts subject to these demand curves. Because the
household demand curves have constant elasticity, ﬁrms set prices as a ﬁxed markup, 1/ρ,






Sticky price ﬁrms set prices at the beginning of the period, after the exogenous shocks
are realised. Here, as in the work of Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987), sticky price ﬁrms must
set their price in advance and must produce the amount of goods demanded at that price.
These ﬁrms, like the ﬂexible price ﬁrms, also wish to set their price as a markup, 1/ρ, over
marginal cost, W/θ. In order to do so, they need to forecast the wage rate, W. They do that by
taking the wage rate as given by the private sector equilibrium. Thus, the wage they expect






Turning to the government, we assume that there is no government debt, government
consumption is ﬁnanced with lump-sum taxes and government consumption is the same for
all goods. As a result, the resource constraint for this economy is that
θn = g + z [µc11 +( 1− µ)c12]+( 1− z)[µc21 +( 1− µ)c22],
where g denotes the exogenous shock to government consumption. Since there is no govern-
ment debt, bond market-clearing requires that B =0and A =1 . Also, money market-clearing
requires that M =1 .
2.3. A private sector equilibrium
We now deﬁne an equilibrium for each possible private sector state, (s,R), and future mon-
e t a r yp o l i c yr u l e ,R(s).
Deﬁnition 1. For each (s,R),g i v e nR(s), a private sector equilibrium is a number,
Pe(s), and a collection of functions, q(s,R),W(s,R),X(s,R),v (A,s,R) and d(A,s,R), such
that the following hold:
1. The functions v and d solve (5).
2. Firms maximize proﬁts; that is, q(s,R) satisﬁes (7), and P e(s) satisﬁes (8).
3. The resource constraint is satisﬁed at d(1,s,R).
114. The asset markets clear; that is, A0(1,s,R)=M(1,s,R)=1 .
Notice that a private sector equilibrium is deﬁned for all values of R, not just for
R = R(s). We deﬁne a private sector equilibrium outcome as the allocations and prices that
occur when A =1and actual policy, R, coincides with expectations of policy, R(s):
Deﬁnition 2. For each s, a private sector equilibrium outcome is a collection of
numbers, P e(s),q (s,R(s)),W(s,R(s)),X (s,R(s)),v (1,s,R(s)) and d(1,s,R(s)).
Combining (7) and (8), we have that in a private sector equilibrium outcome,
q(s,R(s)) = 1. (9)
2.4. The monetary authority’s problem and a Markov equilibrium




where v is the value function in a private sector equilibrium. Recall that a private sector
equilibrium takes as given the evolution of future monetary policy. Thus, in solving (10), the
monetary authority implicitly does too.
We now have the ingredients needed to deﬁne a Markov equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 3. A Markov equilibrium is a private sector equilibrium and a monetary
policy rule, R(s), such that R(s) solves (10).
12Note that in a Markov equilibrium, the current money growth rate does not aﬀect the
household’s discounted utility starting from the next period since that rate does not aﬀect the
next period’s state. Therefore, the monetary authority faces the static problem of maximizing
the current period’s utility, and we only have to describe how the current interest rate aﬀects
current allocations. In a way parallel to that used for a private sector equilibrium outcome,
we deﬁne a Markov equilibrium outcome as a Markov equilibrium in which actual policy, R,
coincides with expectations of policy, R(s):
Deﬁnition 4. For each s, a Markov equilibrium outcome is a collection of numbers,
Pe(s),q (s,R(s)),W (s,R(s)),X (s,R(s)),v (1,s,R(s)) and d(1,s,R(s)), where R(s) is the
monetary policy rule associated with a Markov equilibrium.
A useful benchmark for assessing Markov equilibrium outcomes is the commitment
equilibrium. With commitment the monetary authority chooses policy for all periods and
states at the beginning of period 0. It is straightforward to show that in such an equilibrium
the nominal interest rate, R, equals unity in all periods and states. The reason is as follows.
In our economy, decisions are distorted in two ways. One is that monopoly power creates a
wedge between the marginal rates of substitution between consumption and leisure and the
associated marginal rate of transformation. The other distortion is that a positive nominal
interest rate induces households to consume an ineﬃc i e n t l yl o wl e v e lo fc a s hg o o d s . S i n c e
prices are set after the realisation of shocks, they are not sticky in equilibrium; therefore, the
monetary authority cannot reduce the monopoly wedge. Since the monetary authority can
control the interest rate, it optimally eliminates the interest rate distortion by setting R =1 .
133. ANALYSIS OF EQUILIBRIUM
In our analysis, we decompose the ﬁrst-order condition associated with the monetary au-
thority’s problem, (10), into the beneﬁts and costs of inﬂation. To obtain these beneﬁts and
costs, we begin by characterising a private sector equilibrium. We then solve the monetary
authority’s problem. We show that, generically, at least two allocations satisfy the neces-
sary conditions for a Markov equilibrium. We present numerical examples in which these
allocations also satisfy the suﬃcient conditions for a Markov equilibrium.
3.1. Characterising private sector equilibrium
We ﬁrst characterise a private sector equilibrium outcome. We use this characterisation to
construct a private sector equilibrium.
With arguments of functions omitted for convenience, the ﬁrst-order necessary condi-



























(1 − µ)(1 − z)
, (15)
Xu21




where uij denotes the partial derivative of u with respect to cij and v1 denotes the partial
derivative of v with respect to its ﬁrst argument. Equations (11) and (12) equate the marginal
14rate of substitution between sticky and ﬂexible price goods to the relative price of these goods
q, and equations (13) and (14) equate the marginal rate of substitution between cash and
credit goods to their relative price, the interest rate. Equation (15) is obtained by noting that
the marginal rate of substitution between labour and consumption of ﬂexible price credit
goods is equal to the ratio of the nominal wage to the price of ﬂexible price goods. This
ratio is simply the markup in (7). Finally, (16) is the intertemporal Euler equation for asset
accumulation.
The cash-in-advance constraint can be written as
µzc11 + q(1 − µ)zc12 ≤
1
Pe. (17)
A necessary condition for the household problem to be well-deﬁned is that
R ≥ 1. (18)
It is easy to show that the cash-in-advance constraint holds with equality if R>1 and that
if the cash-in-advance constraint is slack, then R =1 . These observations imply that the
appropriate complementary slackness condition is that
½ 1
Pe − [µzc11 + q(1 − µ)zc12]
¾
(R − 1) = 0. (19)
The resource constraint is that
g + z [µc11 +( 1− µ)c12]+( 1− z)[µc21 +( 1− µ)c22]=θn. (20)
15We now can use the preceding equations to compute a private sector equilibrium
outcome. Recall that a private sector equilibrium is conditioned on some given policy rule,
R(s). We ﬁxt h ep o l i c yr u l eR(s).We set q =1 , and for each s, we use (11)—(15), (19) and
(20) to compute the six numbers Pe(s),n (1,s,R(s)),c ij(1,s,R(s)), for i,j =1 ,2. Notice that
one of the equations in (11)—(14) is redundant and can be deleted. Thus, we can use these
six independent equations to compute the six numbers of interest. The wage rate, money
growth rate and value function in a private sector equilibrium outcome are straightforward
to compute. For future use, note that c(1,s,R(s)) is obtained from (1) using cij(1,s,R(s)).
Given P e(s) from a private sector equilibrium outcome, we can compute a private
sector equilibrium as follows. For each s and each R, we use (11)—(15), (19) and (20) to
compute the functions n(1,s,R),c ij(1,s,R), for i,j =1 ,2,a n dq(s,R). As above, note that
c(1,s,R) is obtained from (1) using cij(1,s,R).
3.2. The monetary authority’s problem
The monetary authority’s problem is static because we focus on Markov equilibria and the
economy has no state variables. Recall that, in a Markov equilibrium, policymakers face
dynamic problems only if their decisions aﬀect future state variables. Without state variables,




denote the utility associated with an interest rate, R, where c(1,s,R),n (1,s,R) are the
16private sector equilibria just constructed. The monetary authority’s problem is now
max
R U(s,R), (21)
subject to R ≥ 1.3 Then the policy rule associated with a Markov equilibrium is the value of
R(s) for each s that solves (21).
3.3.AM a r k o ve q u i l i b r i u m
We can think of constructing a Markov equilibrium in at least two ways. One is to treat
(21) as deﬁning an operator that maps the space of policy rules into the space of policy
rules. The Markov equilibrium policy rule can be constructed by ﬁnding a ﬁxed point of this
operator. Another way to think of this construction is to think of (9), (11)—(20) and the ﬁrst-
order necessary condition associated with (21) as a system of equations used simultaneously
to solve for a Markov equilibrium. The ﬁrst-order condition is obtained by using (11)—(20)
to obtain the derivatives of consumption and labour with respect to R, holding Pe ﬁxed,
and evaluating these derivatives at a point that solves (11)—(20) with q =1 . If the ﬁrst-order
condition for the monetary authority is also suﬃcient, then the two approaches are equivalent.
We pursue the second approach here.
We show that, generically, at least two allocations satisfy the necessary condition
associated with (21). In a large class of parameterisations for our economy, we veriﬁed
numerically that this necessary condition is also suﬃcient. We also derive a relationship
between the payment technology parameter z and the allocations and prices in a Markov
equilibrium. We use this relationship when we discuss a Markov equilibrium with a variable
payment technology.
17The ﬁrst-order condition associated with a solution to the monetary authority’s prob-
lem, (21), is
UR(s,R)=uccR + unnR ≤ 0, (22)
with equality if R>1. In (22), UR is the derivative of U with respect to R and uc,u n are
derivatives of the utility function with respect to consumption and employment, respectively.
Also, cR,n R are the derivatives of the private sector equilibrium functions, c(1,s,R) and
n(1,s,R), with respect to R. If R(s) is a Markov equilibrium policy rule, then it satisﬁes
(22).
Now we show that (22) can be decomposed into a part that captures the incentives to
increase inﬂation because of the presence of monopoly power and a part that captures the
disincentives arising from the resulting reduction in cash goods consumption. Speciﬁcally, we
prove the following proposition:
Proposition 1. Suppose R(s) is a Markov equilibrium policy rule. Then there exist



































UR(s,R(s)) = f(c1,c 2)[ψMD(R(s),z) − ψID(R(s))],
where c1 = c11(1,s,R(s)) = c12(1,s,R(s)) and c2 = c21(1,s,R(s)) = c22(1,s,R(s)). The
18function, f(c1,c 2), is provided in the Appendix.
Our notation emphasises the dependence of ψMD on z because this dependence plays an
important role in our later discussion.
Before proving the proposition, we highlight three features. One is that in any interior
equilibrium, ψID(R(s)) = ψMD(R(s),z), so that determining an equilibrium reduces to
ﬁnding values of R for which the right side of (23) equals the right side of (24). Note also
that, as we show below, the function ψMD(R,z) can be interpreted as arising from the
distortions induced by monopoly power and the function ψID(R) can be interpreted as the
distortion arising from the inﬂation tax. This interpretation helps us to understand the costs
and beneﬁts that the monetary authority weighs in making its policy decision. Finally, note
that the shocks, θ and g, do not enter into the functions, ψMD or ψID. Thus, R(s) does not
depend on s.
Proof. We prove the proposition by proving a lemma. Consider ﬁrst the function ψMD.
To obtain this function, note that the eﬃcient allocations in our economy satisfy this:
un +
θu22
(1 − µ)(1 − z)
=0 . (25)
The ﬁrst term in (25) is the marginal disutility of labour associated with increasing labour
input to credit goods production, say, and the second term is the marginal beneﬁtf r o m
increased credit goods consumption. In our economy, the analogue of (25) is (15). Note that
because of the presence of monopoly power, the right side of (15) is the same as the second
term in (25) multiplied by ρ<1. As a result, the net marginal beneﬁt of increasing labour
from its equilibrium value in our economy is positive. This distortion is due to monopoly
19power and suggests that the left side of (25) is a natural measure of the monopoly distortion in
our economy. To isolate that measure in the monetary authority’s problem, add and subtract





(1 − µ)(1 − z)
#
nR + uccR −
θu22nR
(1 − µ)(1 − z)
. (26)
The term in brackets is our measure of the monopoly distortion.
In the Appendix, we prove the following lemma regarding the terms in (26):
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(1 − µ)(1 − z)
= −f(c1,c 2)ψID(R), (28)
where ψMD(R,z) and ψID(R) are as deﬁned in (23) and (24).
Proposition 1 then follows from Lemma 1. k
To see that ψID is a measure of the inﬂation distortion, we use a simple consumer
surplus type of analysis. In a monetary economy, let D(r) denote the demand for real
balances, m, with respect to the net interest rate, r ≡ R − 1. Let g(m)=D−1(r). Consumer
surplus, S, is the area under the money demand function. A rise in the interest rate acts like
a tax and reduces consumer surplus. We are interested in the marginal eﬀe c t so ft h i st a x ,






































As we will see below, the key features of ψID(R) that deliver multiplicity are shared by
rD0(r). This result is one motivation for interpreting ψID(R) as the inﬂation distortion.
For another motivation, consider the following. Use c2/c1 = R1/(1−ρ) and the deﬁnition
of ψID to obtain ψID(R)=( R − 1)c1/c2. The net interest rate, R − 1, measures the extent
to which cash goods consumption is distorted relative to the eﬃcient level. This distortion
is akin to a tax. (See the work of Lucas and Stokey, 1983.) The base on which this tax is
levied is the consumption of cash goods. Thus, one way to think of ψID is as the product of a
tax rate, R−1, and the base of taxation, c1, scaled by a measure of the size of the economy,
c2. This reasoning provides an alternative motivation for using ψID to measure the inﬂation
distortion. In the eﬃcient allocations, R =1and ψID(1) = 0.
We now discuss some properties of the two distortions, ψMD and ψID. From (23), the
21following is clear:















Note that ψMD(R,z) does not depend on the shocks θ and g. Next, inspecting (24), we have
that ψID ≥ 0 and
lim
R→∞ψID(R)=ψID(1) = 0. (30)
That is, there is no inﬂation distortion when the interest rate is high or low.
A numerical example helps illustrate the results in Proposition 1. We use µ =0 .1,
ρ =0 .45, ψ =1 , g =0 .05,θ=1 . Figure 1 displays the monopoly distortion, ψMD, and the
inﬂation distortion, ψID, for R ∈ [1.0,4.5] and for z =0 .13 and 0.15. The ﬁrst-order necessary
condition for monetary authority optimality is satisﬁed at the point where the two distortion
functions intersect. The ﬁgure shows that the ﬁrst-order necessary condition for monetary
authority optimality is satisﬁed at R =1 .38 and R =2 .07 for z =0 .13 and at R =1 .10 and
R =3 .17 for z =0 .15. For z =0 .15, the inﬂation rate is somewhat below 10 percent in the
low inﬂation equilibrium and just below 217 percent in the high inﬂation equilibrium.
From Proposition 1, (22) becomes
UR = f(c1,c 2)ψ(R,z) ≤ 0, (31)
with equality if R>1. Here ψ(R,z)=−ψID(R)+ψMD(R,z). Since f(c1,c 2) > 0, as o l u t i o n
to
ψ(R,z) ≤ 0, (32)
22with equality if R>1, satisﬁes the necessary condition for a Markov equilibrium. If (22) is
also suﬃcient, then the interest rate, R, which solves (32) corresponds to a Markov equilibrium
policy rule. Given an equilibrium value of the interest rate, we can solve for the allocations
and other prices by setting q =1and using (11)—(15), (17) with equality and (20) for each
value of θ and g.
We use the properties of the monopoly distortion function, ψMD, in (29) and the
inﬂation distortion function, ψID, in (30) to show that, generically, if this model has any
Markov equilibria, it has at least two.
Proposition 2 (Generic Multiplicity). Suppose that the monetary authority’s ﬁrst-
order condition is suﬃcient for optimality. Then, generically, the model has either no Markov
equilibria or at least two. Furthermore, the equilibrium interest rate does not depend on θ or
g.
Proof. A key property of the function ψ(R,z) is that it is positive for R suﬃciently
large. This property follows from (29) and (30), which imply that
lim
R→∞ψ(R,z) = lim
R→∞[ψMD(R,z) − ψID(R)] > 0.
Suppose ﬁrst that ψ(1,z) > 0. Then, since ψ(R,z) is positive at R =1and positive
for large R, continuity implies that if ψ(R,z) is ever zero, it must generically be zero at
least twice. A nongeneric case occurs when the graph of ψ(R,z) against R is tangent to
the horizontal axis at a single value of R. Another nongeneric case is when ψ(1,z)=0and
ψ(R,z) > 0 for R>1. Both cases are nongeneric because for an arbitrarily larger value of z,
the model must have multiple equilibria since ψ(R,z) is strictly decreasing in z.
23Suppose next that ψ(1,z) < 0.T h e nR =1satisﬁes (32) and corresponds to a Markov
equilibrium. In addition, because ψ(R,z) > 0 for R suﬃciently large, continuity implies that
ψ(R,z) must be equal to zero for at least one value of R>1.
From (24), we have that ψID does not depend on θ or g. Since ψMD does not depend
on these variables either, the equilibrium interest rate, R, does not depend on θ or g. k
We construct two examples to illustrate Proposition 2 and to compare outcomes be-
tween the low and high inﬂation equilibria. We also construct a third example to illustrate
that the ﬁrst-order condition of the monetary authority may not be suﬃcient for optimality.
In all three examples, we use the values of µ, ρ, ψ, g and θ used in Figure 1. The ﬁrst example
has z =0 .13, the second has z =0 .15 a n dt h et h i r dh a sz =0 .152. In Table 1, we display
the candidate private sector equilibrium outcomes which satisfy the ﬁrst-order condition of
the monetary authority.
Note from Table 1 that c1,Rand Pe are quite diﬀerent in the high and low inﬂation
outcomes. The primary cost of high inﬂation is that it results in an ineﬃcient level of cash
goods consumption. For example, when z =0 .13, cash goods consumption (c1) is more than
50 percent lower in the high inﬂation equilibrium than in the low inﬂation equilibrium. Note
that credit goods consumption (c2) changes little. Employment changes little either, because
the bulk of labour is allocated to credit goods production.
We ﬁnd that the ﬁrst-order condition for monetary authority optimality is suﬃcient
in the examples with z =0 .13 and z =0 .15. We determine suﬃciency by examining the
monetary authority’s objective function, (21), at each value of P e that corresponds to a
private sector equilibrium. When z =0 .13, we ﬁnd (in numerical results not reported here)
24that this objective function is concave for a range of values of R up to roughly 4, for both
the high and low inﬂation values of Pe.W h e nz =0 .15 or 0.152, this objective function is
a l s oc o n c a v ef o rt h el o wi n ﬂation value of Pe.
We illustrate this concavity by graphing the objective function when z =0 .15 for the
low inﬂation value of Pe in Figure 2a. In Figure 2b we plot the corresponding objective
function for the high inﬂation value of P e.T h i sﬁgure shows that the objective function is
locally, though not globally, concave. In addition, the ﬁgure shows that the high inﬂation
candidate maximises the monetary authority’s objective and is, therefore, an equilibrium.
In our third example, the low inﬂation candidate also turns out to be an equilibrium,
but the high inﬂation candidate does not. In Figure 2c we plot the monetary authority’s
objective function at the high inﬂation value of P e. This ﬁgure shows that, although R =3 .27
is a local maximum, the global maximum is R =1 .4 This ﬁgure illustrates forcefully that the
monetary authority’s objective function must be checked globally, rather than just locally.
Clearly, merely checking second-order conditions is not enough.
4. AN ECONOMY WITH VARIABLE PAYMENT TECHNOLOGY
Now we develop a version of our model with a variable payment technology. For convenience,
we refer to the economy of the last section as the economy with a ﬁxed payment technology.
The variable payment version delivers a related but diﬀerent channel by which monetary
policy can be caught in an expectations trap. This version is also interesting in its own right
as a model of ﬁnancial intermediation. Finally, we use this model to analyse how equilibrium
interest rates ﬂu c t u a t ei nr e s p o n s et os h o c k s .
254.1. The alternative model
In this version of the model, the fraction of goods purchased with cash, z, is chosen by the
household at the beginning of the period, before the monetary authority chooses the interest
rate, R. This timing assumption turns out to imply that we can characterise the equilibrium
with two relationships. One relationship is between R and z for the ﬁxed payment technology
economy. The other relationship is obtained from the optimality condition associated with z.
Consider a version of the ﬁxed payment technology economy in which each consump-
tion good, c(ω), can be purchased with either cash or credit, with ω ∈ (0,1).F o r g o o d s
with ω>¯ z (where ¯ z is a parameter), the cost of purchasing with credit is zero. Purchasing
goods with ω ≤ ¯ z on credit requires labour time. The household chooses the fraction z ≤ ¯ z
such that goods with ω<zare purchased with cash and goods with ω ≥ z are purchased
with credit. This cash-credit decision is made before the household knows which goods are
produced by sticky or ﬂexible price ﬁrms, so that the cash-credit good choice is independent
of the type of ﬁrm.
The labour time required to purchase fraction z of goods with cash is given by η(¯ z −
z)1+ν/(1 + ν),w h e r eν>0 is a parameter and η>0 is a shock to the payment technology.
Since this shock is realised at the beginning of the period, the exogenous state is now given
by s =( θ,g,η). The household’s labour time, l, is divided between time spent working in the
market, n, and time spent on the payment technology as follows:
l = n +
η(¯ z − z)1+ν
1+ν
. (33)
Leisure time in the household’s utility function is now given by 1 − lt, rather than 1 − nt.5
26The decision problem of the household with respect to consumption, employment and
asset accumulation described above is unchanged, except that now z is added to the state
variables in (5) and (6) and labour is given in (33). The household chooses z to solve the
following problem:
z(A,s) = argmax v(A,z,s,R(s)), (34)
where v is the analogue of the value function in (5). Note that the choice of z depends on
the household’s expectations of the monetary authority’s policy rule, R(s), since z is chosen
before R.
A Markov equilibrium, a private sector equilibrium and associated outcomes are de-
ﬁned in the obvious way. (For these deﬁnitions, see Albanesi, Chari and Christiano, 2002a.)
We now characterise a Markov equilibrium for the variable payment technology economy. In
addition to all the equilibrium conditions for the economy when z is ﬁxed, this equilibrium
must satisfy optimality of the choice of z.
4.2. Equilibrium
4.2.1. Characterisation. We analyse a Markov equilibrium for this economy by ﬁrst
establishing a relationship between the Markov equilibrium interest rate and the payment
technology parameter, z, holding z ﬁxed.
In Albanesi, Chari and Christiano (2002a), we show that Proposition 1 extends without
change to the variable payment technology economy, namely, that the monetary authority’s
optimality condition can be written as ˜ f(c1,c 2)ψ(R,z) ≤ 0, where ψ(R,z) i sg i v e ni n( 3 1 )
and the function ˜ f is strictly positive. Note that ψ(R,z) does not depend on s =( θ,g,η).
Thus, the equilibrium interest rate must satisfy the same conditions in the variable payment
27technology economy as in the ﬁxed payment technology economy.
Consider the equilibrium interest rate holding z ﬁxed, given by the solution to the
analogue of (32). This solution depends on z, a sc a nb es e e nf r o m( 2 3 )a n d( 2 4 ) .W ec a l lt h i s
relationship between R and z the interest rate policy correspondence (or policy correspondence,
for short). The following proposition establishes properties of this correspondence:
Proposition 3 (Interest Rate Policy Correspondence). Suppose that the mon-
etary authority’s ﬁrst-order condition is suﬃcient for optimality. Suppose also that for some
z<¯ z, a Markov equilibrium exists. Then there is a critical value of z, say, ˆ z, such that
for z<ˆ z, the economy has no Markov equilibria; for z =ˆ z, it has at least one Markov
equilibrium; and for z>ˆ z, it has at least two Markov equilibria.
Proof. First, we show that when z is suﬃciently small, no interest rate less than ¯ R is
an equilibrium, where ¯ R is arbitrarily large. Note from (23) that ψMD(R,z) →∞as z → 0
for all R ∈ [1, ¯ R] and from (24) that ψID is bounded. Then, for some value of z, say, ˆ z1,
ψ(R,z) is strictly positive for all z ≤ ˆ z1. Thus, no equilibrium interest rate is less than ¯ R for
z suﬃciently small.
Second, we show that no interest rate greater than ¯ R can be an equilibrium. We see
from (24) that ψID is boundedaboveby, say, k.Let ˆ z2 bedeﬁned by limR→∞ ψMD(R, ˆ z2)=2 k.
Such a value of ˆ z2 exists from (29). Note also that for all z ≤ ˆ z2, limR→∞ ψMD(R,z) ≥ 2k. By
deﬁnition of a limit, some interest rate ¯ R exists such that for all R ≥ ¯ R, ψMD(R, ˆ z2) ≥ 2k−ε,
where ε is, say, k/2. Therefore, for all R ≥ ¯ R, ψ(R, ˆ z1)=−ψID(R)+ψMD(R, ˆ z1) ≥ k/2 > 0.
That is, no value of the interest rate greater than ¯ R is an equilibrium for z =ˆ z2.S i n c e
ψMD(R,z) is decreasing in z, no value of the interest rate greater than ¯ R is an equilibrium
28for z ≤ ˆ z2. We have established that if z is suﬃciently small, then this economy has no
equilibrium.
Next, ψMD(R,z) is a continuous function of R and z. As z is increased from some
arbitrarily low value, some ﬁrst value of z exists so that ψ(R,z)=0for some R. Such a
z –c a l li tˆ z – exists by our assumption that an equilibrium exists for some z.C o n s i d e r
increasing z above ˆ z. Since ψMD is strictly decreasing, the graph of ψ(R,z) against R must
intersect the horizontal axis at two points, at least. Thus, for z>ˆ z, the economy has at least
two Markov equilibria. k
Consistent with our theoretical ﬁndings, Figure 1 has shown that the inﬂation distor-
tion does not depend on the payment technology parameter, z, while the monopoly distortion
is decreasing in this parameter. We graph the policy correspondence in Figure 3.6 Notice
that when z is below ˆ z =0 .127, an equilibrium does not exist. The reason, of course, is
that when z is suﬃciently small, the monopoly distortion lies above the inﬂation distortion,
and the economy has no equilibrium. As z increases, the monopoly distortion declines. At
a critical value of z, equal to ˆ z, the economy has a unique equilibrium, and for values of z
larger than this critical value, the economy has two equilibria. Notice that as z increases, the
equilibrium interest rate falls in the low inﬂation equilibrium and rises in the high inﬂation
equilibrium.
We now develop the second relationship between the equilibrium interest rate, R,
and the payment technology parameter, z. We obtain this relationship from the ﬁrst-order
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We can use the equations that deﬁne a private sector equilibrium, (9), (11)—(15), (17) with
equality and (20) to substitute for labour, n, in (35). Doing so (in Lemma 2 in the Appendix),
we obtain that
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For each z, at most one R solves (36). To see this result, note that the left side of (36)
is increasing in R, while the right side does not depend on R.L e t Rp(z,g,θ,η) denote the
value of R that solves (36). We refer to this function as the payment technology function, or
payment function, for short.
We develop the set of payment technology parameters z for which this function is
deﬁned as follows. As R →∞ , the left side of (36) converges to (1−ρ)/[(ρ+ψ)(1−z)],w h i c ha t






1 − [¯ z1+νη/(1 + ν)] − g/θ
,
then the function Rp(z,g,θ,η) goes to inﬁnity at some critical value of z, say z∗.T h e nt h e
function is deﬁned for (z∗, ¯ z]. If not, then the function is deﬁned for (0, ¯ z]. Let the domain of
the function be (˜ z,¯ z], where ˜ z = z∗ if the above inequality holds and ˜ z =0otherwise.
We know from (36) that Rp is decreasing in z, since the left side of (36) is increasing
30in z, while the right side is decreasing in z. We also know that Rp is increasing in g/θ and
η since an increase in g/θ or η increases the right side of (36) and so increases R for a given
value of z.
Each R, z which satisﬁes the policy correspondence, (31), and the payment function,
(36), corresponds to a Markov equilibrium. The other allocations, prices and the monetary
authority’s policy rule can be obtained by solving (9), (11)—(16), (17) with equality and (20).
Next, we prove a proposition that under certain conditions on the policy correspon-
dence, the economy has two Markov equilibria. We say that the policy correspondence is
horseshoe-shaped if it satisﬁes the following conditions: (i) there exist two continuous func-
tions, R1
c(z) and R2
c(z), which map [ˆ z,¯ z] into the space of interest rates with R1
c(z) <R 2
c(z),
for z ∈ (ˆ z,¯ z],R 1
c(ˆ z)=R2
c(ˆ z), and (ii) for all z ∈ [ˆ z,¯ z], the solution to (32) is either R1
c(z) or
R2
c(z), where ˆ z is deﬁned as in Proposition 2.
Proposition 4. Suppose the policy correspondence is horseshoe-shaped. Then, gener-
ically, the economy with a variable payment technology satisﬁes the necessary conditions for
a Markov equilibrium twice, if at all.
Proof. Suppose to begin with that ˜ z<ˆ z. Recalling that Rp(¯ z)=1and R1
c(¯ z),R 1
c(¯ z) ≥
1, we can divide the proof into two cases: when Rp(¯ z) <R 1
c(¯ z) and when Rp(¯ z)=R1
c(¯ z)=1 .
Consider the ﬁrst case, that is, when Rp(¯ z) <R 1
c(¯ z) ≤ R2
c(¯ z). Here, if Rp(ˆ z) >R 1
c(ˆ z)=
R2
c(ˆ z), then since Rp is below R1
c and R2
c at ¯ z and above R1
c and R2
c at ˆ z, by continuity, Rp
must intersect at least once with each R1
c and R2
c. Each of these intersections corresponds
to a Markov equilibrium. If Rp(ˆ z) <R 1
c(ˆ z)=R2
c(ˆ z), then since Rp is below R1
c at both ¯ z
and ˆ z, Rp and R1
c intersect twice, if at all. The case when Rp(ˆ z) >R 1
c(ˆ z)=R2
c(ˆ z) is clearly
31nongeneric.
Now consider the second case, that is, when Rp(¯ z)=R1
c(¯ z)=1 . Then the policies and
allocations associated with an interest rate of unity constitute an equilibrium. Generically,
there must also be one other equilibrium. To see this, note that, generically, if R1
c(¯ z)=1 , then
some neighbourhood of ¯ z exists such that for all z in this neighbourhood, R1
c(z)=1 . Since Rp
is strictly decreasing, it follows that for z in this neighbourhood, Rp(z) > 1=R1
c(z). Suppose
that Rp(ˆ z) <R 1
c(ˆ z). Then since Rp is above R1
c in a neighbourhood of ¯ z and below R1
c at ˆ z, by
continuity Rp and R1
c must intersect at least once. Now suppose that Rp(ˆ z) >R 1
c(ˆ z)=R2
c(ˆ z).
Then since Rp is below R2
c at ¯ z and above R2
c at ˆ z,by continuity Rp m u s ti n t e r s e c ta tl e a s to n c e
with R2
c. We have established that in this second case, generically, the necessary conditions
for equilibrium must be satisﬁed twice, if at all.
Suppose, ﬁnally, that ˜ z>ˆ z.T h e n f o r z near ˜ z, Rp is arbitrarily large and must be
larger than R2
c. Exactly the same arguments used above can then be used to conclude that
the necessary conditions for a Markov equilibrium must be satisﬁed twice, if at all. k
The restriction that the policy correspondence be horseshoe-shaped is not severe. In
Proposition 3 we have shown that for each z>ˆ z, at least two interest rates belong to
the policy correspondence. Using the implicit function theorem, we can represent these
interest rates as continuous functions of z. Thus, the assumption that the correspondence is
horseshoe-shaped only rules out the possibility that three or more interest rates belong to
the correspondence. Extending the proof of Proposition 4 to this case is straightforward, but
tedious. Furthermore, in all the numerical examples we have considered, the correspondence
is horseshoe-shaped.
324.2.2. Properties. Now we describe the properties of the interest rate policy corre-
spondence and the payment function for various realisations of shocks to the production
technology and the payment technology in a numerical example. We do this in Figure 4. Fig-
u r e4 as h o w st h ei n t e r e s tr a t ec o r r e s p o n d e n c ea n dt h ep a y m e n tf u n c t i o nf o rt w or e a l i z a t i o n s
of the production technology shock, θ, with the other shock held at its mean value. Figure
4b shows an analogous graph for the payment technology shock, η.
These graphs display four properties:
• The policy correspondence does not depend on the shocks, as we saw in Proposition 1.
• The payment function is decreasing in the interest rate, as discussed above.
• The payment function is increasing in η and decreasing in θ, as also discussed above.
• There are two Markov equilibria. The low inﬂation equilibrium is the one associated
with the lower intersection of the interest rate correspondence and payment function;
the high inﬂation equilibrium is the one associated with the higher intersection.
Figure 4 displays an interesting sign switch phenomenon; the interest rate response
to a shock switches sign between the high and low inﬂation equilibria. For example, from
Figure 4a, we see that the interest rate is increasing in the technology shock in the low inﬂa-
tion equilibrium and decreasing in this shock in the high inﬂation equilibrium. We veriﬁed,
for our numerical example, that in both equilibria, output is increasing in the technology
shock. If technology shocks were the dominant shocks, then the correlation between output
and the interest rate would be positive in the low inﬂation equilibrium and negative in the
high inﬂation equilibrium. From Figure 4b, we see the sign switch for the payment shock:
t h ei n t e r e s tr a t ei sd e c r e a s i n gi nt h i ss h o c ki nt h el o wi n ﬂation equilibrium and increasing in
33this shock in the high inﬂation equilibrium. In our numerical example, output is increasing
in the payment shock in the low inﬂation equilibrium and decreasing in this shock in the high
inﬂation equilibrium. So, if payment shocks were the dominant shocks, then the correlation
would be negative in both equilibria. Therefore, in an economy with both shocks, the corre-
lation of output and the interest rate is negative in the high inﬂation equilibrium and larger
(perhaps even positive) in the low inﬂation equilibrium. We call this ﬁnding the decreasing
correlation implication.
Our numerical examples also show that the volatility of interest rates is substantially
smaller in the low inﬂation equilibrium than in the high inﬂation equilibrium. The reason
is that the policy correspondence is ﬂatter at the low inﬂation equilibrium than at the high
inﬂation equilibrium. We call this ﬁnding the increasing volatility implication.
Elsewhere we ﬁnd that both of these implications are supported by data for high and
low inﬂation episodes in a cross-section of countries (Albanesi, Chari and Christiano, 2002a).
5. KEY FEATURES BEHIND EXPECTATION TRAPS
Now we ask which features of our model are crucial for generating expectation traps. We
focus on six features and ﬁnd that three of them play essential roles, one plays a convenient
role and two play a subsidiary role. We also brieﬂy discuss extensions of the analysis.
One feature essential for expectation traps to occur is the assumption that some prices
are preset. To see the importance of this assumption, suppose that all prices are ﬂexible. Then
the monetary authority cannot reduce the monopoly distortion by making inﬂation higher
than expected because monopolists simply raise their prices in response to expansionary
monetary policy; the monopoly wedge is thus invariant to monetary policy. Furthermore, an
34expansionary policy is costly because it raises the price level, reduces consumption of cash
goods and thereby reduces welfare. Indeed, these forces imply that the monetary authority
gains by pursuing a contractionary policy, as long as R>1. Thus, when all prices are
ﬂexible, the unique Markov equilibrium has R =1 . Technically, this result can be seen by
setting µ =0in (23). After some manipulation, we see that ψMD(R,z) < 0 for all R, so that
the equilibrium has R =1 .
Another essential feature for expectation traps is the assumption that some prices are
ﬂexible. To see the importance of this assumption, suppose that all prices are ﬁxed. Then
expansionary monetary policy is welfare-enhancing because it reduces the monopoly distor-
tion. Such a policy is not costly because with the price level ﬁxed, cash goods consumption
is also ﬁxed. These forces imply that the monetary authority always gains by pursuing an
expansionary monetary policy. As a result, no equilibrium exists. Technically, this result
can be seen from (23), which implies that ψMD →∞as µ → 1. Since ψID is bounded, no
equilibrium exists.
The ﬁnal essential feature for expectation traps is that ﬁrms have monopoly power.
Again, since the only beneﬁt of expansionary monetary policy is to reduce the monopoly
distortion, and since realised inﬂation is costly, the equilibrium without monopoly power has
R =1 . Technically, suppose that ρ =1in (23). Then ψMD(R,z)=0for all R. And the
unique equilibrium has R =1 .
The feature of our model that is convenient for expectation traps to occur is our
timing assumption under which monetary injections cannot be used to purchase cash goods
in the same period. This assumption implies that a monetary expansion, by raising prices,
directly reduces consumption of cash goods. This reduction in the consumption of cash goods
35lowers welfare. An alternative timing assumption is that of Lucas and Stokey (1983), under
which households can use the current monetary injection for current cash goods purchases.
Mechanically, Lucas-Stokey timing amounts to adding current money growth to the right side
of the cash-in-advance constraint. Since a monetary injection can then be used to purchase
current cash goods, a greater than expected expansion does not directly change the mix of
cash and credit goods consumption. Induced movements in the interest rate could change
this mix, and that possibility is worth exploring.
The subsidiary features of our model in generating expectation traps concern the
speciﬁcation of preferences and that of money demand. These features are subsidiary in the
sense that altering preferences and the nature of money demand eliminates the multiplicity of
equilibria in the ﬁxed payment technology model but not in the variable payment technology
model.






where a is a parameter. We show that the ﬁxed payment technology economy has a unique
equilibrium, but the variable payment technology economy may have multiple equilibria.
Roughly, the reason is as follows. The monetary authority’s ﬁrst-order condition can be
decomposed into two distortion functions: a monopoly distortion and an inﬂation distortion.
Here the monopoly distortion is negative for R =1and positive for R suﬃciently large.
The inﬂation distortion function is similar to that in Figure 1. The two functions intersect
only once, so the ﬁxed payment technology economy has a unique equilibrium. The interest
36rate policy correspondence that is analogous to the one in Figure 3 becomes a downward-
sloping graph. Nevertheless, since the payment function is also downward-sloping, there can
be multiple intersections and multiple equilibria.
In terms of money demand, in Albanesi, Chari and Christiano (2002b) we present a
model which shares many of the features of our model here, except for the speciﬁcation of
money demand. Interestingly, in that model, the monetary authority’s ﬁrst-order condition
can be decomposed into terms similar to the inﬂation and monopoly distortion functions.
Indeed, the form of the inﬂation distortion function turns out to be identical to the form
here. In particular, substituting c2/c1 = R1−ρ into (24), we see that




In both our 2002b work and here, the inﬂation distortion has the form given in (37). It is
easy to see that when R is suﬃciently large, ψID is approximately given by Rm/c, where
m denotes real balances and c denotes total consumption. In this study, as R →∞ , m
approaches zero faster than R approaches inﬁnity, so that ψID → 0 as R →∞ . In our 2002b
work, however, ψID d o e sn o tg ot oz e r ob e c a u s em approaches zero at the same rate as R
approaches inﬁnity. The key diﬀerence in the two studies lies in the interest elasticity of money
demand. In the 2002b work, money demand is inelastic, and the inﬂation distortion function
increases monotonically; and the inﬂation and monopoly distortion functions intersect only
once. Thus, the ﬁxed payment technology model has at most one equilibrium. With a
variable payment technology, however, multiple equilibria are possible. In the ﬁxed payment
technology model here, money demand is elastic, the inﬂation distortion function is U-shaped
37and the inﬂation and monopoly distortion functions intersect twice.
In terms of extensions, it would be useful to ask whether these equilibria are stable
under various learning schemes. In our numerical examples, including the one associated with
Figure 1, the inﬂation distortion has a single-peaked Laﬀer curve shape, while the monopoly
distortion is relatively ﬂat. This shape is reminiscent of the shape of the monetary Laﬀer curve
in analyses in which governments rely on inﬂation to ﬁnance expenditures. (See, for example,
the work of Sargent and Wallace, 1981.) In those analyses, there are two steady-state levels of
inﬂation, but only one of them is stable under a large class of learning schemes. In Albanesi,
Chari and Christiano (2002a), we examine the stability properties of the equilibria in our
model under a simple learning scheme. We ﬁnd that both equilibria are stable. Exploring
stability under a broader class of learning schemes would be of interest.
It would also be useful to analyse nonstationary equilibria in our model. Here we have
focused on Markov equilibria which are stationary in the sense that they cannot depend on
time. If we add calendar time as a state variable, then our model has other Markov equilibria
as well. For example, one such equilibrium has the economy moving to the low inﬂation
equilibrium in even-numbered periods and to the high inﬂation equilibrium in odd-numbered
periods. More interesting is the possibility of sunspot-driven Markov equilibria in which a
sunspot at the beginning of each period coordinates private agents’ expectations and induces
agents to pick the high or the low inﬂation equilibrium depending on the realisation of the
sunspot. Such sunspot equilibria clearly exist and lead to volatility in inﬂation rates.
386. RELATED LITERATURE
Our work adds to a small literature in which the monetary authority explicitly chooses policy
without commitment and without trigger strategies. Dedola (2002) and Khan, King and
Wolman (2001) also generate multiple equilibria in such models. The mechanism for gener-
ating multiplicity in Dedola (2002) is similar to ours here. Khan, King and Wolman (2001)
have a ﬁnite-horizon model in which in every period, one-third of ﬁrms choose the prices that
they will charge for the next three periods. When ﬁrms expect high inﬂation, they choose
high prices. The cost of not validating ﬁrms’ expectations is that relative prices become dis-
torted, and output falls. The staggered setting in the Khan, King and Wolman model plays
the same analytic role as the Svensson (1985) timing assumption in our model. Both features
have the eﬀect that realised inﬂation is costly. In some of the literature using sticky prices,
ﬁrms are allowed eﬀectively to choose diﬀerent prices for each period (though are not allowed
to make these prices contingent on shocks). We conjecture that with such a formulation, the
equilibrium in the Khan, King and Wolman model would be unique. The Khan, King and
Wolman model also simply imposes money demand by adding an equation to the equilibrium
of the model which requires consumption to equal real balances. This additional equation
is not the same as a cash-in-advance constraint on households because ﬁrms and households
will not accept money for the goods they receive in the last period. It would be interesting to
ask whether in an inﬁnite-horizon version of the Khan, King and Wolman model the interest
elasticity of money demand would matter for multiplicity.
It is increasingly standard in monetary economics to characterise equilibria without
commitment in stochastic economies by studying linear-quadratic approximations around a
39steady state. (See, for example, the work of Clarida, Galí and Gertler, 1999.) This literature
simply assumes the steady-state values of policy variables like inﬂation. The diﬃculty is that
in determining steady-state policy, the policymaker needs to forecast how private agents will
respond to alternative policies. That is, an analysis like ours here is necessary in order to
determine steady states before one knows around what point to conduct the approximation.
If the linear-quadratic method yields deviations from the state which are independent of the
value of that state, then the method may be a good approximation of equilibria that remain
close to steady state. In economies with multiple steady states, like ours, however, the method
would entirely miss any equilibria in which the economy switches from one steady state to
another.
7. CONCLUSION
Here we have asked and answered two questions. One is, Why do economies experience
persistent episodes of high and low inﬂation? The answer, according to a standard model,
is that these episodes are expectation traps that arise due to the absence of commitment in
monetary policy. The main force driving expectation traps is defensive actions taken by the
public to protect themselves from inﬂation. Those actions reduce the costs of inﬂation for
a benevolent monetary authority and induce the authority to supply the expected level of
inﬂation. Our other question is, What should be done to prevent the high inﬂation episodes
from recurring? The answer, according to our model, is to somehow make the monetary
authority commit itself to a policy, for then the economy has a unique equilibrium with
low inﬂation on average. That is, our study suggests that there are gains from setting up
institutions which increase commitment to future monetary policies.
40Notes
1Notice that we do not include the beginning-of-period aggregate stock of money in
our states. In our economy, all equilibria are neutral in the usual sense that if the initial
money stock is doubled, an equilibrium exists in which real allocations and the interest rate
are unaﬀected and all nominal variables are doubled. This consideration leads us to focus
on equilibria which are invariant with respect to the initial money stock. We are certainly
mindful of the possibility of equilibria which depend on the money stock. For example, if
multiple equilibria in our sense exist, then trigger strategy—type equilibria which are functions
of the initial money stock can be constructed. In our analysis, we exclude such equilibria.
2In Albanesi, Chari and Christiano (2002a), we show that this speciﬁcation of the
monetary authority’s choice variable is equivalent to one in which the monetary authority
chooses the money growth rate.
3Technically, the set of interest rates should also be limited to those in which (11)—
(15) and (17)—(20) have a solution. Our analysis of the monetary authority’s problem uses
a ﬁrst-order condition approach which only asks whether small deviations are optimal. The
implicit function theorem can be used to show that in some neighbourhood of an equilibrium,
(11)—(15) and (17)—(20) have a solution. Thus, we will not have to deal with whether the
allocation functions are well-deﬁned for arbitrary interest rates.
4Of course, R =1is not a Markov equilibrium, because P e = 171.6 and R =1is not
part of a private sector equilibrium outcome.
5For payment technology models with similar features, see Cole and Stockman (1992),
Schreft (1992), Ireland (1994), Dotsey and Ireland (1996), Lacker and Schreft (1996), Aiya-
41gari, Braun and Eckstein (1998), and Freeman and Kydland (2000).
6In all the numerical examples we have studied, the necessary conditions also turn out
to be suﬃcient.
42APPENDIX
Proofs of Lemmas 1 and 2




(1 − µ)(1 − z)
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(1 − µ)(1 − z)
= −f(c1,c 2)ψID(R), (39)
where ψMD(R,z) and ψID(R) are as deﬁned in (23) and (24).
Proof.T op r o v eL e m m a1 ,w eu s et h en e c e s s a r ya n ds u ﬃcient conditions for an interior
















22 = θ(1 − n). (43)
We have omitted (14) because (11)—(14) include only three linearly independent equations.
These expressions together with (19) and (20) are necessary and suﬃcient conditions for a
private sector equilibrium.
Lemma 1 is established using (40)—(43), (17) with equality and (20) to construct
43functions cij(s,Pe,R),q (s,Pe,R) and n(s,P e,R), diﬀerentiating these functions with respect
to R and evaluating the derivatives at q =1 . Mechanically, we ﬁrst drop n from the system
by substituting out for n in (43) using (20). Then we diﬀerentiate (40)—(42) and simplify
to obtain one equation containing the derivatives of c11 and q with respect to the interest
rate, c11,R and qR. We use (17) to obtain another equation in these derivatives. We can then
evaluate all the other derivatives. We prove the lemma in two parts
Lemma 1a. In a Markov equilibrium,
(1 − ρ)θu22nR
(1 − µ)(1 − z)
= f(c1,c2)ψMD(R,z), (44)
where f(c1,c 2) > 0 for c1,c 2 > 0 and ψMD(R,z) is given in (23).





11 + z(1 − µ)c
ρ
12 +( 1− z)µc
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= θ − g − z [µc11 +( 1− µ)c12] − (1 − z)[µc21 +( 1− µ)c22].
Diﬀerentiating with respect to R, we get that





1 c11,R + z(1 − µ)c
ρ−1
1 c12,R +( 1− z)µc
ρ−1













2 c22,R =0 ,
where all derivatives are evaluated at a value of Pe such that q =1 . Here, when q =1 ,
44c1 = c11 = c12 and c2 = c21 = c22.N o ww ed i ﬀerentiate (40)—(42) with respect to R to obtain
that
















Diﬀerentiating (17) with equality and substituting for c12,R from (46), we obtain that







+( 1− µ)zc1qR =0 .





From (46)—(49), using (c2/c1)1−ρ = R, we obtain that
µc11,R +( 1− µ)c12,R = c11,R −
(1 − µ)c1
1 − ρ
qR = c11,R[1 − (1/ρ)], (50)
































45Substituting from (49)—(53) into (45), we obtain that
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1 c11,R + z(1 − µ)c
ρ−1
1 c12,R +( 1− z)µc
ρ−1
















































Diﬀerentiating the resource constraint, we obtain nR:
θnR = z [µc11,R +( 1− µ)c12,R]+( 1− z)[µc21,R +( 1− µ)c22,R]













































































,w eo b t a i nt h a t
(1 − ρ)θu22nR









































−1 − (1 − ρ)
#
. (58)
Consider the term in brackets in (58). Using (54), this term is
µ 1
R
¶ z +( 1− z)R
1
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We have proved the ﬁrst part of Lemma 1. k
48Lemma 1b. In a Markov equilibrium, (28) holds; that is,
uccR −
θu22nR
(1 − µ)(1 − z)
= −f(c1,c 2)(R − 1)R
1
ρ−1. (59)
Proof. Using our functional forms, we obtain that
uccR −
θu22nR



























































































We have proved the lemma. k





































49Proof. The necessary and suﬃcient conditions for a private sector equilibrium are
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We use the resource constraint, (20), and (61) to obtain an expression for c2 in terms of c1/c2






















































































After rearranging and making use of R =( c1/c2)ρ−1, we obtain (36). k
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.130 Low .17 .31 1.38 .339 49.1
High .08 .32 2.07 .337 99.2
.150 Low .25 .30 1.10 .342 26.3
High .04 .33 3.17 .336 165.0
.152 Low .26 .30 1.08 .343 25.4






























Monopoly Distortion, high z  (0.15)
 ψ 
MD
1.10 1.38  2.07  3.17 
Figure 1: The Monetary Authority’s Marginal Beneﬁts and Marginal Costs
1Figure 2
The Monetary Authority’s Objective Function
for Two Fractions of Goods Purchased With Cash
















Figure 2a: Objective Function in Low Inﬂation Equilibrium, z =0 .15

















Figure 2b: Objective Function in High Inﬂation Equilibrium, z =0 .15


















Figure 2c: Objective Function in Candidate High Inﬂation Equilibrium, z =0 .152


























Figure 3: Interest Rate Policy Correspondence
6Figure 4
Markov Equilibrium Interest Rate Policy Correspondence
and Payment Technology Functions


































Figure 4a: Markov Equilibrium With Production Technology Shock, θ




























Fraction of Goods Purchased with Cash, z
Policy Correspondence
Payment Function, Low  η
Payment Function, High  η
Figure 4b: Markov Equilibrium With Payment Technology Shock
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